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“I HAVE BEFORE ME THE
IDEA OF A DOVE”
Bringing Motion to Mind
in Burke’s

A Philosophical Enquiry into
the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful

Alan T. McKenzie

"Natural objects affect us, by the laws of that connexion,
which Providence has established between certain motions
and configurations of bodies, and certain consequent feelings
in our minds. "1

This sentence, which opens Part Five of the Enquiry, puts
motion before configuration and ascribes it to objects, with the
implication that our “consequent feelings" have more to do
with motion than shape, and perhaps also that natural objects
are more moving, as well as more mobile, than artificial ones.
Notice, in passing, that the “connexions" between the motions
and configurations of bodies and “certain consequent feelings in
our minds" have been established by “Providence," for Burke
the ultimate source of impetus and the authority for these

1 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful, ed. James T. Boulton (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, [1968], 163 All quotations from the Enquiry are from this edition.
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movements.2 Burke then mentions painting, which adds
imitation, and architecture, which adds reason, to the natural
stimulations of natural objects. He moves on to a not very
satisfactory discussion of the connections of words with the
sublime, without pausing to notice (nor, so far as I can see, has
anyone else) that in doing so, he has first removed motion, and
then absorbed and controlled it. I propose to investigate a
sequence of passages in which the Enquiry brings motion to
mind, sometimes to stir the mind, sometimes to eliminate the
motion, and sometimes to encourage and control it with the
stabilities of architecture and the subtleties of print.
Motion comes to mind at critical junctures throughout the
Enquiry. The motions of the objects the mind contemplates
are analyzed, the dynamics of various natural and artificial
images and examples are considered, and the movements of the
argument and the author’s own mind are attended to. Oc
casionally readers are invited, by implication and exhortation,
to attend to the movements of their own minds as they
consider examples, real and supposed, put forth in the course
of the argument. The need for the mind to be moved, the
capacity of words to move it, and the historical examples,
artistic images, and natural objects that bring several kinds of
motion to the mind constitute the subject of this essay. The
introduction of various kinds of movement at various stages of
the argument and the striking devices by which the Enquiry
contains movement and achieves stability constitute its thesis.
I begin with the first of four quite terrific, but remarkably
unmoving, examples that seem both crucial to the working of
the essay and essential to the theme of movement in the mind.
Burke added this example in the “Introduction on Taste," with
which he began the Second Edition of the Enquiry (1759). It
extends the excessively conventional illustration (drawn from
Apelles) of the shoemaker who set the painter right about
shoes in several directions, geographic, aesthetic, psychological,
and, ultimately, political:
A fine piece |i. e. painting] of a decollated head of St.
John the Baptist was shewn to a Turkish emperor; he

2 Burke's obligations to the providential tradition are well set forth in Howard
Caygill Art of Judgement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 80-85; John Dennis
connected the sublime to the sacred in The Advancement and Reformation of
Modern Poetry (1701).
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praised many things, but he observed one defect; he
observed that the skin did not shrink from the wounded
part of the neck. The sultan on this occasion, though his
observation was very just, discovered no more natural
Taste than the painter who executed this piece, or than
a thousand European connoisseurs who probably never
would have made the same observation. His Turkish
majesty had indeed been well acquainted with that
terrible spectacle, which the others could only have
represented in their imagination. On the subject of their
dislike there is a difference between all these people,
arising from the different kinds and degrees of their
knowledge; but there is something in common to the
painter, the shoemaker, the anatomist, and the Turkish
emperor, the pleasure arising from a natural object, so far
as each perceives it justly imitated; the satisfaction in
seeing an agreeable figure; the sympathy proceeding from
a striking and affecting incident. So far as Taste is
natural, it is nearly common to all.3

Burke employs this example early in his analysis of the
empiricism and universality of taste; I begin with it because of
its striking immobility. No one in the passage moves, and no
one is moved by it, “terrible” though it is. It seems to me that
Burke must have counted on the contrast between the shudder
in the reader’s mind and the mere curiosity or indifference in
the minds of the various participants in the two beheadings,
the first one primarily religious, and the second primarily
aesthetic. Its immobilities are generic and empirical—generic in
that, as a painting, it is only an imitation, and only a depiction
(Burke had read The Poetics). This example is less moving than
three other examples of the mind-body problem later in the
Enquiry, two drawn from current events, and one from
humanism and history. It is also, I think we must agree, far
less moving than either the Biblical incident there depicted or
the subsequent demonstration so thoughtfully supplied by the
Sultan. We must assume that the painter viewing the piece was
less moved by the work of a fellow painter than by the
demonstration ordered for his benefit. Burke's sources suggest

3 20; Boulton supplies a detail which Burke omitted; "the Emperor. Mahomet
II, to prove the validity of his criticism, ordered a slave to be beheaded so that
Bellini might see how the skin shrank back from the wouod"—n6.
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as much; in them the painter fled Constantinople fearing his
own neck would be next.4
While it is easy to suspect both racism and creedism in the
actions and the indifference of the "Turkish emperor," it is
more to the point to notice that the immobility of the incident
must be ascribed to empiricism, with important implications
for the aesthetics of that now discredited "-ism." The Sultan
was not moved by the painting (nor, we may assume, by the
demonstration) because the “'terrible spectacle" depicted and
then reenacted was so familiar to him. His reaction to the
painting was determined by what he did know, about execu
tions, and what he did not know, about the subject of the
painting. And what he knew and did not know was deter
mined exclusively by what he had seen (or not seen) and how
often he had seen it.
The sultan's indifference to so much sanctity and suffering
is all the more striking in that no motion has been brought to
any mind up to this point in the Enquiry. It first enters a few
pages later, in a discussion of certain westerners who are
equally immune to the stimuli of art, religion, or history:

There are some men formed with feelings so blunt, with
tempers so cold and phlegmatic, that they can hardly be
said to be awake during the whole course of their lives.
Upon such persons, the most striking objects make but
a faint and obscure impression. There are others so
continually in the agitation of gross and merely sensual
pleasures, or so occupied in the low drudgery of avarice,
or so heated in the chace of honours and distinction, that
their minds, which had been used continually to the
storms of these violent and tempestuous passions, can
hardly be put in motion by the delicate and refined play
of the imagination. (24)
This first bringing to mind of motion barely suggests the
necessity, complexity, and significance of the process through
out the remainder of the Enquiry. It does, however, indicate
that those who are neither sultans nor swine have minds that
can, indeed must, be “put in motion." It is that necessity on

4 See Carlo Rjdolfi, Le Maravight dell Arie (Venice, 1648, ), 1, 40—41 and Roger
De Piles Abrege de La Vie des Peineres (Paris: Nicolas Langlois, 1699), 253.
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which the aesthetics of the essay, the humanism of the author
and his readers, and the social dynamics of the period depend.
The degree to which a mind is put in motion becomes a
measure of the humanity of that mind.
Conversely, the nature of the stimuli serves as an indication
of the extent to which that mind has been civilized. These
first two passages may, in combination, be taken as a subtle
comment to this effect; the sultan has been over-civilized, but
in the wrong culture, while those whose minds have become
used to gross pleasures or violent and tempestuous passions are
impervious to, or spoiled by, it. This is a comment of the sort
we might rather expect from Hume or Gibbon. The other
examples and images we shall have occasion to inspect will
confirm that in the aesthetic system in which they participate
it is natural for the mind to be moved, and it is civilized for it
to be moved by the artifacts that culture has created or
converted. We have already seen the brief extent to which
several minds have been moved by a painting. We will soon
calibrate the motions induced by some other aesthetic objects,
including poems, plays, and buildings, and by one soothing
commercial product and social practice, tobacco. We will also
have to consider, before we are through, three more execu
tions.
In confining the mind to responses to those objects it
can have brought to it, Burke adheres to the empirical tenets
of his contemporaries. This restriction has the virtue of
making the movements of that mind shareable, predictable,
and, under the best circumstances, manageable. Later ages took
it upon themselves to provide the mind with more violent and
creative movements, and then to do away with it as an agent
or an entity altogether. Burke goes only so far along this path
as to allow that the “mind of man possesses a sort of creative
power,” but one restricted to representing “the images of things
in the order and manner in which they were received by the
senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and
according to a different order. This power is called Imagina
tion.”
While it would be intriguing to consider the extent to
which an imagination that is only the representative of the
senses” (16) differs from various current notions that the mind
is, if in fact there is any such thing, merely the product of
cultural conventions, economic circumstances, assorted dis
courses, or biological secretions, the salient point for Burke is
that the mind’s operations consist primarily of responses to
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pleasures and pains conveyed to it Sy the senses from the wide
assortment of particulars in the world around it. The examples
that he draws from that assortment, examples from nature, art,
literature, history, and contemporary politics, control and
illuminate his argument. They illustrate the movements of
every mind and impart movement to the reader's mind in ways
that bear examination.
The natural objects which produce sensations are sufficiently
various to impart movement and prevent stagnation, but
sufficiently categorizable to enable investigation. Nature is
comprehensive, but by no means incomprehensible Which is
not to say that it will yield entirely to clear—or even stable—i
deas definitions, or tastes:

For when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing
nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we
often take up by hazard, or embrace on trust, or form
out of a limited and partial consideration of the object
before us, instead of extending our ideas to take in all
that nature comprehends, according to her manner of
combining. We are limited in our enquiry by the strict
laws to which we have submitted at our setting out. (12)
These notions are "ours," but they are also random, partial,
circumscribed, and more restrictive than the comprehensive
nature they fail to do justice to. In dealing with a nature as
"comprehensive" as this, the mind will have to exert itself
constantly. It can never settle for, or into, "notions." Only a
mind in motion, a mind constantly "extending” itself to
incorporate vastly different elements, will do. The lines from
Horace which Burke drew from his own mind in support of
this point read:
---------- Circa vilem patulumque morabimur orbem
Unde pudor proferre pedem vetat aut operis lex.
[[f you do not] linger along the easy and open pathway,
[and if in your copying you do not leap into the narrow
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well,] out of which either shame or the laws of your task
will keep you from stirring a step.5
These lines suggest the necessity of a more spacious concep
tion for the creative mind, and they encourage movement
along neglected paths and over unbroken ground. That well,
which Burke omitted, seems to be circumscribing rather than
deep. Effective composition will present the author’s investiga
tions in such a way as “to set the reader himself in the track of
invention, and to direct him into those paths in which the
author has made his own discoveries" (13). 1 read this passage
as an expression of the movements good prose can impart to
a good mind—movements that are controlled, original, stimulat
ing, steady, and well thought through. The best prose will
move a good mind through a landscape in which instructive
examples, lofty images, solid figures, wise words, and established authors rise to view. Burke’s prose—all of Burke’s
prose—moves the mind of his reader through a landscape rich
in vivid and extreme particulars, the better to perform the
empirical task: “Let us first consider this point in the sense of
Taste, and the rather as the faculty in question has taken its
name from that sense. All men are agreed to call vinegar sour,
honey sweet, and aloes bitter" (14). While he needs natural
substances for this part of his argument, these particulars,
typically, have been fetched from all over the palate, and the
globe—especially the aloes, from Asia, by way, perhaps, of the
Bible. He allows for a difference between natural ana artificial
objects, and confesses “that custom, and some other causes,
have made many deviations from the natural pleasures or pains
which belong to these several Tastes; but then the power of
distinguishing between the natural and the acquired relish
remains to the very last" (14). This passage has not been

5 Horace, Ars Poetica. 11. 132, 135, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, The Loeb
Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 460-61. This is
one of many of Burke’s examples which Boulton labels 'miscquoted' (12n2),
Frances Ferguson cites other "‘misquotations' in pursuit of Burke s susceptibility
to rhetoric, surely the point is that Burke was quoting from memory. See 'The
Sublime of Edmund Burke, or the Bathos of Experience.' Glyph 8 (1981); 62-78,
esp. 67-9 (reprinted in Solitude and the Sublime; Romanticism and the Aesthetics of
Individuation, (New York: Routledge, 1992), 43-5. It is worth mentioning that
throughout the Enquiry, and indeed in everything he spoke and wrote, Burke, like
Longinus, found rhetoric an especially effective means of moving the mind, and
was moved by the eloquence of others, much of which he had stored in his
memory.
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sufficiently noted by those who choose to regard Burke and his
contemporaries as prisoners of their language, their economic
system, or one or another of their well-polished conventions.
These extreme particulars quicken the mind of every reader;
they keep the argument vivid and moving; and they enable
the writer and the reader to keep pace with one another. This
point may be illustrated with the natural, but both convention
al and far-fetched commodity, tobacco. Burke’s selection of
natural stimulants is instructive. Subscribers to The Spectator
confirm and satisfy their taste with tea (#409), while Hume
confirms both taste and empiricism by borrowing from
Cervantes a hogshead of old wine tasting of iron and leather
(in "Of the Standard of Taste”). Burke looks into these
particular and extreme stimulants by looking not at the
singular tastes acquired by one individual, but at the practices
(to use a term that would not have been in his vocabulary,
though the idea was manifestly available to him) of other
nations, and other classes. Note the distrust of substances that
move the mind directly, bypassing the perceptual processes on
which the Enquiry and empiricism depend:
Thus opium is pleasing to Turks, on account of the
agreeable delirium it produces. Tobacco is the delight of
Dutchmen, as it diffuses a torpor and pleasing stupefac
tion. Fermented spirits please our common people,
because they banish care, and all consideration of future
or present evils. (15)
While this discussion of the ways in which natural stimu
lants move the minds of members of other nations, ethnic
groups, and classes may suggest that Burke’s mind was not
open in ways we might wish it had been, it also indicates
several of the directions in which it was working—towards
classification, identifiable and explicable uniformity, and an
instructive excitement. Various aspects of experience produced
disagreeable, but uniform and wholly understandable sensations
in the minds of whole nations and classes of people, who then
turned to artificial substances for alternative sensations. For
Burke, and not only for Burke, it is inconceivable that a lone
Dutch person would acquire a taste for tobacco. Partly
because s/he would never get his/her hands on the stuff, and
partly because even if s/he did, its taste, in the absence of
agreeable cultural associations, would not be genial.
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Which is not to suggest that Burke is recommending
tobacco as the stimulant of choice to move the British mind in
the right directions, or at the right speed. He has, as I have
already suggested, another engine, a bookish one, in mind.
The movements that all these other, actual external particulars
impart to the mind can be, given the capacities for error in the
various faculties of the mind, erratic, excessively violent, or
otherwise misleading. The mind is not always, indeed not
usually, set in motion in the right direction. Thus taste often
goes astray, led by “the gloss of novelty," pushed by weakness
and indolence, or bewildered by "ignorance, inattention,
prejudice, rashness, levity, obstinacy" (24-5).
Fortunately,
however, taste (from whatever distance it has to import the
commodities that satisfy it at the moment) does not make the
mind go very far, or very fast: "It is known that the Taste
(whatever it is) is improved exactly as we improve our judg
ment, by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to
our object, and by frequent exercise" (26). The deliberate
movements of the judgment, mentioned here with evident
approval, impede the excessive mobility of the imagination by
“throwing stumbling blocks" in its way (25). These blocks are
fashioned out of the concrete material of experience.
All the faculties of the mind, though Burke is not certain
whether taste is a separate faculty or a complex function of the
judgment, have ground to cover—it is their pace that needs
adjusting. The best minds learn to cover it slowly, as Burke
proves by an analogy of the mind put in motion by print: "At
first they [who have cultivated that species of knowledge which
makes the object of Taste] are obliged to spell, but at last they
read with ease and with celerity" (26). The mind, in other
words, is put into motion of the right kind and direction by
print. Books are not the stumbling blocks of the imagination,
but the paving stones of reason.
Part One of the Enquiry begins with “novelty” and “curios
ity," either one of which has some capacity to move the mind,
but a capacity that is soon dismissed. The first is the most
superficial and fleeting of properties to inhere in (or rather rest
lightly on the surface of) objects, while the second "is the most
superficial of all the affections; it changes its object perpetual
ly” (31). Moreover, and worse, curiosity "quickly runs over
the greatest part of its objects" (31). Its skimming of surfaces
condemns curiosity and the minds it inhabits to a superficiality
inimical to the principles of empiricism: “We see children
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perpetually running from place to place to hunt out something
new; they catch with great eagerness, and with very little
choice" (31—we can see this in the several stanzas of the “Ode
on a Distant Prospect of Eton College,” among other places).
Curiosity will not bring to mind the kind of motions necessary
to develop gravity, maturity, or discrimination, three essential
components of Augustan aesthetics, Augustan ethics, Augustan
literature, and the well-formed Augustan mind.
[f the world had only “novelty" to offer and the mind only
“curiosity" to receive it, soon even the feeble movement
motivated by a change of objects would cease. A little novelty
in objects and a little curiosity in the mind can help the mind
to make something of itself in the face of the world that it
inhabits, but they can help only a little. They won’t "move”
it much, and they won't "turn" it at all—terms we will come
to appreciate as this essay progresses. The Augustan mind
needed more and better stirring than either novelty or curiosity
could provide. This forceful and lasting motion will be
brought to the mature mind by the capacity of objects,
persons, and events to excite pain or pleasure (32), the central
distinction on which the entire argument of the Enquiry
depends.
Before Burke considers pleasure and pain in earnest, he
posits a state necessitated by the thrust of his argument but
drawn, he insists, from introspection, the state of indifference.
He needs it, he detects it, ana he abhors it: "There is nothing
which I can distinguish in my mind with more clearness than
the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain” (33).
Indifference serves to separate pain from pleasure as pan of the
insistence that the former cannot be, as Locke had argued,
merely the removal of the latter. Convenient though it is for
his argument, indifference is but a state of stagnation from
which the mind must be provoked by external stimuli. While
Burke does not distrust indifference as much as, say, Johnson,
or fear it is much as, say, Cowper, (or, for that matter,
cultivate it as much as Hume) neither does he see it as a state
to be indulged or prolonged. The last thing the Augustan
mind wanted was an opportunity to descend into itself in
search of deep, internal, and otherwise unavailable truths.
While the mind must move, it has no more reason or desire to
move into itself than it has capacity to move by itself. It can
watch itself work, it can attend to rhe movements external
stimuli produce within it, and it can make those workings and
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movements clear to itself and to others, all through the
inductions of language, over which, as they thought, the
Augustan mind could, if it worked at it, exercise control.
This state of indifference disappears in the face of the central
division of the essay between pleasure (the result of passions
that concern society, and thus the source of the beautiful) and
pain (the result of passions that concern self-preservation, and
thus the source of the sublime). The definition of the sublime,
spelled out here, indicates the psychodynamics inherent in it:
“Whatever is fitted in any sort co excite the ideas of pain, and
danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is
productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable
of feeling" (39).
This definition calls forth the second of the executions that
both stabilize and impart energy to the Enquiry. This one,
too, was added, in the Second edition, in support of the
argument regarding the power of pain. It adduces the torments
of Damiens, the would-be regicide whose painful and lingering
punishments in Paris in January of 17S7 would have been fresh
in the minds of Burke and his readers. This could have been
the most moving passage in the Enquiry (as may be confirmed
by anyone who will consult or recall the opening pages of
Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison). As
it stands, however, the excruciating and overtly political
tortures of Damiens are absorbed into and immobilized by the
argument.
The incident is invoked in support of Burke's insistence that
the body conveys real pain more forcibly than the mind could
imagine the most intense pleasures: “Nay I am in great doubt,
whether any man could be found who would earn a life of the
most perfect satisfaction, at the price of ending it in the
torments, which justice inflicted in a few hours on the late
unfortunate regicide in France" (39). Notice that the reader’s
mind is moved to concentrate on only as much space as is
occupied by the regicide's (or the reader's own) body, and to
dweli in only “a few hours" of time (Damiens was tortured for
days). Worse than pain, but a logical extension of it, Burke
continues, is death.
In fact, "what generally makes pain
itself.. more painful, is, that it is considered as an emissary of
this king of terrors" (40). Students of Burke’s politics, and
perhaps his psychology, will connect the occasion of the
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execution with that regal noun. Excessively ingenious readers
may divert themselves by considering that "emissaries’' move
so that Kings may stay seated.
All readers must sense that this second turning to execution
is scarcely more moving than was that of the earlier behead
ings. This passage occurs in a brief digression on the sublime
embedded in a section of the book otherwise given over to the
placid pleasures of beauty. John the Baptist’s head was severed
for reasons of lust or prudery, and cited in the course of a
discussion of taste. Damiens was quartered in the interests of
political stability (indeed, immobility), and cited as an example
of “justice." This justice, French justice refined to the point of
barbarism, sought to move the mind by rending the body.
The power of this example to move the mind of the reader
seems to have been so taken for granted that Burke spares his
reader, as Foucault does not, the tremendous particulars. In
his aesthetics, if not always in his political pamphlets, Burke’s
prose moves the reader's mind only with its own, inherent
force; a force that sometimes contains the violence of exceed
ingly moving particulars.
The third example of the artfully suppressed and exploited
dynamics of an execution appears near the end of Part One, in
the course of the discussion of the differences between imita
tion and representation with respect to tragedy.
Burke
supposes the movement of a crowd from the theater to the
gallows. This execution is more English, more hypothetical,
and, in one sense more moving than that of Damiens in that
the crowd bestirs and removes itself. The example hints at the
moderation of movements widened, that is, socialized, into
more minds than one. It also evokes the curious aesthetics of
the stage of state.
Burke is dealing with the complicated passions of sympathy,
imitation, and ambition, though most of what he has to say
pertains only to sympathy. Imitation had been so thoroughly
dealt with oy Aristotle that Burke leaves it alone, and the
third, ambition, does not long detain him. In separating
sympathy from imitation and demonstrating the priority and
strength of the former, Burke turns from pleasure to delight
and the effects of tragedy rather than painting. The movement
is greater here because delight contains an element of muted
terror drawn from the spectacle of calamity, either on the stage
or in history.
Tragedy's capacity to move an audience,
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however, is nothing in comparison to that of an actual spec
tacle:

Chuse a day on which to represent the most sublime and
affecting tragedy we have; appoint the most favourite
actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and decorations;
unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting, and music;
and when you have collected your audience, just at the
moment wnen their minds are erect with expectation, let
it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the
point of being executed in the adjoining square; in a
moment the emptiness of the theatre would demonstrate
the comparative weakness of the imitative arts, and
proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy. (47)6
In proving that sympathy has more power than imitation
Burke also indicates the relative immobility of the arts, the
weak motives of beauty, and the strong and stirring induce
ments of terror. Staged tragedies, even brilliantly staged
tragedies, can certainly make the mind “erect.” But the theatre
of political cruelty will empty the play-house and fill the
square. Any public execution, even one as strikingly unpar
ticularized as this one, will be more moving than any play.
More moving too, it seems fair to venture, than any painting,
or any prose account of an execution, even one that concluded
with ecartement. Boulton suggests (47 nl7) that it was the
singularly moving execution of Lord Lovat in April of 1747
that Burke had in mind. But Burke supplies no indication that
this was the case, and does nothing whatsoever to bring the
particulars of this or any other incident to the mind of his
reader. He strengthens his argument by generalizing both the
aesthetic and the historic particulars. This time readers are

6 Richard Payne Knight objected that the crowd's movement would be as much
a matter of curiosity as of sympathy, and would depend on the relative
infrequency of executions. He suppons this point by supposing what would
happen if the theatres had been closed except for one night during the '‘juridical
slaughter and methodical murder" of the French revolution. An Analytical Inquiry
into the Principles of Taste, 2nd ed. (London: T. Payne, 1805), 317-18: this text
is much concerned with both energies and cruelties. See also Burke’s later Some
Thoughts on the Approaching Executions (1780), where, according to Christopher
Reid’s Edmund Burke and the Practice of Political Writing (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1985), 30-31, Burke combines the aesthetic and political components
of executions into a “dramatic economy” wherein deliberate movement by the
government inspires awe.
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invited to picture themselves not in the sultan's court, assessing
the royal taste, or in the seat of judgement, confirming the
legitimate (French) torments of a regicide, but in an armchair,
alone with a book, acknowledging the capacity of a spectacle
to move the crowd, but leaving the reader him/herself utterly
undisturbed.
Part One establishes some other discriminations in addition
to the essentia) separation of pleasure from pain and the
suggestive one of imitation from sympathy. Some of these
deserve more consideration than they can be given here. The
separating of delight from pleasure (35—7) and love from lust
(42—3), for example, has implications that extend well beyond
the moving of the mind. In dividing pleasures into "those
which belong to generation" and those that belong to "general
society" (humans), for example, Burke makes only the former
of these pleasures "violent," and that only "at particular times."
Love can, sometimes, produce “very extraordinary effects," but
that is as much as Burke is willing to grant.
Thus divided, these effects require only the slightest figures
or terms of movement, as when animals are said to "pursue
their purposes" directly, and “Men are carried to the sex in
general" (42). Burke shifts this passion from considerations of
movement to considerations of time, or rather season, contrast
ing intermittent human desires with the seasonal rut of
animals: "the generation of mankind is a great purpose, and it
is requisite that men should be animated to the pursuit of it by
some great incentive. It is therefore attended with a very high
pleasure; but as it is by no means designed to be our constant
business, it is not fit that the absence of this pleasure should be
attended with any considerable pain. The difference between
men and brutes in this point, seems to be remarkable" (41). In
other words, the human mind contemplates the beautiful
without hurry or much movement of any sort. The distinc
tion returns later in the essay, as if to protect its stillness, when
Burke again distinguishes beauty from sublimity, and love
“from desire or lust; which is an energy of the mind, that
hurries us on to the possession of certain objects, that do not
affect us as they are beautiful, but by means altogether dif
ferent" (9 1).
Subtle and restrained as the analysis of the social passions
of sympathy, imitation, and ambition may be, the mind barely
stirs; the passions that respond to beauty sit still on the page,
in the gallery, or in the theatre, where they "transfuse. from
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one breast to another" (44). These three passions, especially
sympathy, modify our responses, in ways so tranquil, and so
readily comprehended, that their movement into other,
kindred, minds is scarcely perceptible, but very effective. In
correcting Aristotle by giving primacy to sympathy rather than
imitation, Burke makes aesthetics subject to the confirmation
of others and thus more conventional than formal. This
widening movement, in effect a socializing of aesthetics,
dampens the movement in each mind; shared sensations are
noticeably less dynamic than isolated sensations and individual
judgments. While the self that Burke dealt with was not much
disturbed by beauty, it was confirmed and somehow reassured
by the turbulence and terror of the sublime.
Burke supplements the execution that empties the theatre
with another, much more hypothetical, example, another one
that sounds more like Gibbon than Burke: "This noble capital,
the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no man is so
strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a conflagra
tion or an earthquake, though he should be removed himself
to the greatest distance from the danger. But suppose such a
fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all pans
would croud to behold the ruins, and amongst them many
who would have been content never to have seen London in
its glory?" (47-8). That the greatest number of people move
across the longest distances in this hypothetical, discrediting,
and, it seems fair to add, highly plausible, example confirms the
outmoded assumptions about human nature shared by Burke
and his contemporaries, and still, it seems to me, conveniently
and accurately designated as Augustan humanism.
In distinguishing sympathy, the passion that emptied the
theatre and filled the ruined streets of London, from imitation,
the passion dearest to neo classical criticism, Burke posits a
"rule" to allow us to ascertain which motive has been in effect:
“When the object represented in poetry or painting is such, as
we could have no desire of seeing in reality; then I may be
sure that its power in poetry or painting is owing to the power
of imitation, and to no cause operating in the thing itself...But
when the object of the painting or poem is such as we should
run to see if real, let it affect us with what odd son of sense it
will, we may rely upon it, that the power of the poem or
picture is more owing to the nature of the thing itself than to
the mere effect of imitation (49-50—closing with an acknowl
edgment that “Aristotle has spoken so much and so solidly
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upon the force of imitation in his poetics, that it makes any
further discourse upon this subject the less necessary."). The
reader will have noticed that the power to induce movement
and the need to perform it (“such as we should run to see if
real") are here united.
Part One ends with a claim to have troubled the waters of
“science," which must never be allowed to stagnate. In fact,
Burke seems not to have troubled the waters, but divided
them. On one side we have the placid, still pools of beauty,
on the other, the turbulent oceans of the sublime. By one or
the other of these the mind does move, indeed must be moved,
in response to either pleasure or pain. When it moves in
response to pleasure, it does not move very far or very fast:
“it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run its career, sets
us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind
quickly satisfies; and when it is over, we relapse into indif
ference, or rather we fall into a soft tranquillity" (34). When
it moves in response to pain, it moves fanner, faster, and with
a greater potential to disturb and mislead. Yet the three most
potentially moving passages, the executions of a slave, a
regicide, and a rebel, have scarcely ruffled the surface of the
argument.
Having made this essential division in Part One, Burke
turns to a long consideration of the violent motions of sub
limity. We will bypass these for the moment to consider more
extensively the still pleasures of beauty, disappointing though
that stillness may be. The movements of beauty are mild, and
the stillnesses of pleasure, while not stagnant, nowhere have the
potency of the sublime or the stability of the grand structures
encountered in Part Two. The images of beauty are those of
the swan or the peacock (95), while those of terror are those
of the ox, the bull, the lion, and the tiger (65). The merely
useful horse vanishes in contrast with Job's sublime steed,
whose neck is cloathed with thunder, the glory of whose nostrils is
terrible, who swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage,
neither believeth that it is the sound of the trumpet (65-6; see
96). The violent motions of the sublime in Part Two thus
overshadow the quieter motions of the beautiful in Part Three.
While this overshadowing served Burke's rhetorical and
aesthetic purposes admirably, it somewhat obscures the gradual
acceleration in the movements of the mind that interest me.
When the definition of beauty towards which Part Three
has been working its way finally arrives, it is disappointingly
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placid, yet wholly adequate to the examples it must comprise:
“we must conclude that beauty is, for the greater pan, some
quality in bodies, acting mechanically upon the human mind
by the intervention of the senses" (112). Having shown that
beauty is not dependent on, though it may well be compatible
with, proportion, fitness, or perfection, Burke enumerates "The
real cause of BEAUTY," turning from principles to objects, and
asserting, usefully, that beautiful objects are small, smooth,
gradually varied, delicate, and fair and mildly colored (112-17).
It is in this context that Burke employs the phrase in the title
of this paper—a phrase notable for its stillness rather than its
mobility, potency, or stability: “In this description I have
before me the idea of a dove; it agrees very well with most of
the conditions of beauty. It is smooth and downy; its parts
are (to use that expression) melted into one another; you are
presented with no sudden protuberance through the whole, and
yet the whole is continually changing" (US). He lingers over
the lines of the dove, omitting its wings and its volatility
altogether. He has brought an image of a dove to mind, but
the image does not stir. Nor does it “move" or "turn" the
mind in which it sits. Like most of the images of beauty, this
one emphasizes the "configurations" of natural bodies, at the
expense of their "motions."
The few motions that belong to beauty are relaxing, like
those of a cradle or a carriage, with implications for the class
structure and social landscape of Burke's era. The sense of
beauty is, as we have seen, subjected to a widening movement,
but the widening of the sensations in these examples cannot
reach very far down the social scale, or, it would seem, very
deeply into the mind:
Most people must have observed the sort of sense they
have had, on being swiftly drawn in an easy coach, on
a smooth turf, with gradual ascents and declivities. This
will give a better idea of the beautiful, and point out its
probable cause better than anything else.
On the
contrary; when one is hurried over a rough, rocky,
broken road, the pain felt by these sudden inequalities
shews why similar sights, feelings, and sounds, are so
contrary to beauty. (155)

It seems possible to conclude that the more the body is put
into actual motion, the more superficial will be the effects on
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the mind. Furthermore, this beautiful motion, like almost
everything else that is beautiful, has been highly (but not
widely) socialized. If beauty is conventional, and it is, it is a
restricted convention. The beautiful motions that are brought
to the Augustan mind come through company, but company
so refined as to filter out or mitigate motion. Those few and
rare objects, natural, artistic, or social, that convey a sense of
beauty—the dove, the peacock, the carriage ride, etc.—convey
it only to minds that have moved in circles exclusive enough
to have encountered them, either on private or exotic ground,
or on certain highly refined pages. They all set us down very
nearly where they found us, but before they can do so, we
have to know where to find them, and, what is more, to have
access to those places (i. e. private estates) where they are likely
to be found. The components of refinement, scarcity, society,
sympathy, and convention even in the natural bodies that bring
beauty to mind may be said to moderate their dynamics, social
as well as psychological.
Incidentally, that novelty of which a little was heard in
conjunction with curiosity and indifference (and nothing in
conjunction with the sublime) has some part in our attraction
to beauty, which is “extremely rare and uncommon. The
beautiful strikes us as much by its novelty as the deformed
itself" (103). But the novelty of beauty is a function of its
rarity, and beauty supplies few of the extreme and exotic
particulars that Burke is so resourceful in introducing in his
examination of the sublime. Beauty comes to us in coaches
and such highly socialized and ready to hand (if that hand is
sufficiently elegant) examples as the snuff box (104).
We return now to Part Two and the more violent motions
of the sublime, which are not so much unsocial as anti-social.
Whereas beauty “sets us down very nearly where it found us,"
as if we had stepped gracefully down from an elegant coach,
pain is much more violent, more lasting, in a word, more
moving:
“For when we have suffered from any violent
emotion, the mind naturally continues in something like the
same condition, after the cause which first produced it has
ceased to operate." Just as the “tossing of the sea remains after
the storm," the mind takes much longer to subside (35). It
subsides, for the sake of the argument of Part One, into
indifference rather than pleasure. In Part Two, however, we
begin to notice a wariness of those objects, natural or artificial,
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that impart too much motion to the mind, together with an
inspection of ways to control it.
Part Two begins with astonishment, the sublime alternative
to indifference and "that state of the soul, in which all its
motions are suspended,” but only momentarily, as in that state
"the great power of the sublime...anticipates our reasonings,
and hurries us on by an irresistible force” (57). Burke proceeds
to terror and obscurity, citing passages from Paradise Lost as
examples of obscurity, one of the essential properties of the
sublime. It is not so much a capacity for obscurity as an
inability to achieve the clarity of painting that makes language
so effective, and perhaps dangerous, a vehicle for conveying the
sublime. The extreme particular Burke adduces as an example,
Milton’s description of Death in Book II of Paradise Lost (like
most of the others that matter, “misquoted”—see n5, above) is
“dark, uncertain, confused, terrible, and sublime to the last
degree” (59). The shape (“If shape it might be called that shape
had none”) does not move, but the “uncertainty of strokes and
colouring” imparts to this verbal portrait a far greater power
to move the audience than any painting could achieve. In
reading a passage equally obscure and sublime, the portrait of
Satan, the “mind is hurried out of itself, by a croud of great
and confused images; which affect because they are crouded
and confused” (62). In these examples it would seem as if
“configuration” has fused with “motion”—a device available
primarily in language.
The most numerous and impressive images of movement,
however, are reserved for the consideration of power, which
derives its capacity to move the mind from its essential
connection with pain. This connection is full of implications
for Burke’s politics as well as his aesthetics; it is implicit in
two of the executions we have had occasion to inspect, and
explicit in the third: "But pain is always inflicted by a power
in some way superior, because we never submit to pain
willingly. So that strength, violence, pain and terror, are ideas
that rush in upon the mind together” (65)—the rushing is
illustrated by the comparison, mentioned above, of an ox to a
bull, and a dog to a wolf (65-7). Burke insists on the ferocity
of the latter of each pair, and on the subjection of the former
to our will. But surely the instinctive speed and forceful
motions, neither subject to the will of those who fear, describe,
or even see them, are significant components of these examples.
The contrast, already mentioned, of the draft horse to the
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Joban horse "who swalIoweth the ground with fierceness and rage"
is drawn from here as well (65-6).
When Burke turns, too briefly, to the means by which the
other organs of sensation apprehend sublimity, all of his
examples, as by now we should expect, import an element of
motion: "The noise of vast cataracts, raging storms, thunder,
or artillery, awakes a great and aweful sensation in the mind,
though we can observe no nicety or artifice in those sons of
music. The shouting of multitudes has a similar effect” (82).
The sounds of violent nature in motion and of humans
multiplied beyond sociability into "multitudes" convey terror
through the ears. And since sound itself depends on motion,
both suddenness and intermission can create something of the
same effect (83).
The terror attendant on "the natural cries of all animals”
might also be attributed, in part, to several kinds of mo
tion—the fleet and furtive motions of those who emit them,
as well as the moving of the sounds from unseen and fearful
regions to the ears of the hearer (84). Beautiful sounds,
however, move smoothly, quietly, and without quick transi
tions, suggesting melancholy (122), while smells and tastes are
incapable of producing grand sensations because they do not
require or suggest any movement worthy of consideration (85).
And having mentioned the movements of other animals in
Burke's bestiary, we must add toads and spiders, which are
"merely odious" (86), partly, we may assume, because of the
"motions," as well as the “configurations," of their bodies.
The sublime is, then, those shouting multitudes not
withstanding, far less social, a little more cerebral, and much
more moving than the beautiful. It is, by the definition we
have seen, more elaborate and its images more stirring than
the beautiful. Burke provides examples that produce move
ments in our own minds, introducing complexities, under
statements, and intricacies of their own. Those drawn from
nature, the bull, the wolf, the ocean, and some others I have
not mentioned, have movements of their own that bring other
movements to mind in unexceptional ways. But the execu
tions, to which we now return, invite an elaboration that lakes
into account considerations introduced in the placid sections on
beauty. All these examples stand, or rather stir, in suggestive
contrast to the idea of the dove. The sublime draws its power
from the body, which is more responsive to pains than
pleasures, and conveys this susceptibility directly to the mind.
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The body, as the site of terror, is radically unsocial. Neither
pains nor terrors are susceptible to the widening movement
that spreads pleasures and beauties across a culture. Pain goes
deep; pleasure goes wide.
As we have seen, beautiful objects have a propensity to
widen their effects through a coterie, a function of the social
dynamics (or rather stabilities) of the era as much as the logical
requirements of Burke’s essay. This widening movement,
drawn from the very important concept of sympathy, reenfor
ces the sociability of beauty. Sympathy also contributes,
though with significant differences (and similar circumscrip
tion), to the multiplication of the sublime. If a carriage does
not hold a crowd, neither does a mob attend the theater. Yet
when an audience leaves a theater to join a mob at an execu
tion, presumably the object it moves toward will produce a
“greater" response only in the diminished, statistical sense of
that adjective. Finally, one does not step into a rotunda or
visit Stonehenge, as we are about to do, in a crowd. The
narrow circles in which these sensations oblige the mind to
move impart social stability to both sensations and ideas,
rendering both the beautiful and the sublime, though I have
tried to resist this conclusion, political.
Burke's discussion of power and its terrors moves steadily
toward the contemplation of the power of the Deity, as indeed
the role of Providence in the quotation with which we began
might have suggested. Neither motion nor shape is imputed to
this entity, which shapes and moves everything else. This
acknowledgment might be supplemented by references to
theology on the one hand and psychobiography or politics on
the other, not to refute, but to extend the current investiga
tion. I choose only to mention that Burke confirms this
section with scriptural passages on the shaking of the earth and
the turning of rocks into waters, both standing and a fountain
(69). “Thus we have traced power through its several grada
tions unto the highest of all, where our imagination is finally
lost” (70). This “power” inserted various properties into
various objects, some of them more moving than others. For
reasons that Burke saw no need to go into, the most moving
qualities seem to have been imparted to objects designed to
produce terror. Here, again, we find the theological and the
political impinging on the aesthetic and the psychological. But
the design, both Burke’s and his creator’s, is more beneficent
and intricate than we might have guessed. It seems to have
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been arranged to bring the mind, finally, to firmness and
stability, if not to rest.
The sublimity that architecture brings to mind is durable
and substantial, based on "configuration’' rather than "move
ment," and on magnitude achieved by effort and duration.7
Structures seem to retain and ennoble the effort that went into
them, combining the forces of labor with the force of gravity,
and, in the examples that Burke employs, keeping them in
balance through centuries. Architecture, the most humanistic
of the arts, imparts powerful movement to the mind of the
beholder, enabling that mind to partake of the magnitude,
stability, and design of the object before it The mind is
moved, that is to say, by the immobility of the stone. That
Burke was not in the least susceptible to the power of Gothic
architecture is generally known, well understood, and perhaps
somewhat disappointing. For him, as for Addison (Spectator
#415. which Burke himself cites) it is the perpetual motion of
the rotunda, not the vertical flights of the Gothic arch, that are
sublime:
For in a rotund, whether it be a building or a planta
tion, you can no where fix a boundary; turn which way
you will, the same object still seems to continue, and the
imagination has no rest. But the parts must be uniform
as well as circularly disposed, to give this figure its full
force. (75)
The structure imparts force to the mind, and the mind is
put into motion, enlarging, continuing, controlled, refined, and
grand motion. The well aligned blocks of architecture unite
the motions of the mind with the configurations of bodies.
That the blocks of architecture have been assembled with great
skill and effort, and centuries ago, increases both the power
and the value of the movements they bring to mind. This is
not a matter of casting stumbling blocks before the imagination
to slow down its erratic movements, but of placing hewn
blocks carefully, so that the mind may contemplate them
steadily.

7 For comments on the moral significance of architecture in Augustan humanism,
with special reference to Burke, see Paul Fussell), "The City of Life and the City
of Literature," in The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism: Ethics and Imagery
from Swift to Burke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 171-210, esp. 202-10.
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In discussing "Difficulty,” nearly the last of the properties
of objects likely to produce the sublime, Burke turns to an
extreme particular of stunning immobility—Stonehenge.
Stonehenge comes to Burke’s mind as neither the mysterious
ly political symbol it was for Dryden (in “To my Honour’d
Friend, Dr Charleton”) nor the profoundly mythic one it was
for Thomas Hardy (in Jude the Obscure). Good Newtonian
that he was, Burke directs our attention to the energy required
to move its members into position and the force that holds
them there: "those huge rude masses of stone, set on end, and
piled each on other, turn the mind on the immense force
necessary for such a work” (77). Notice that in this figure the
mind is not "hurried,” but “turned,” an acknowledgement, I
suggest, of the forces, natural and human, embedded in this
structure of rocks, and thence communicated to the mind that
beholds them. That so much energy was expended with
“rudeness" rather than "dexterity” enhances the effect of the
sublime, partly because it was done so long ago, and partly
because it was done with ingenuity and brute strength, rather
than engineering, whether Roman or European. The efforts
that those who constructed Stonehenge, whoever they might
have been, combine with the forces now so manifestly arrested
by it to "turn" the reader’s mind in ways, and at a speed, that
will do it good.
Part Four, on the causes of pain and fear, which is gener
ally acknowledged to be the least satisfactory section of the
Enquiry, begins by supporting its restriction to secondary
causes: "So that when I speak of cause, and efficient cause, I
only mean, certain affections of the mind, that cause certain
changes in the body; or certain powers and properties in
bodies, that work a change in the mind" (130). This section
certainly does less justice to the causes of movement than the
preceding parts have done to its effects. Thus Burke supplies
an analogy that confirms the naturalness, innateness, univer
sality, ana predictability of the connections between the mind
and the body and the external objects that provoke its passions,
likening his explanation to one that accounts only for the
secondary causes of the "motion of a body falling to the
ground" or "the effects of bodies striking one another by the
common laws of percussion.” Just as these explanations stop
short of the final cause, he will "not endeavour to explain how
motion itself is communicated" (130).
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It was, of course, Newton who successfully brought his
mind to the motion of falling bodies and who comprehended
the movements of the universe. Burke pays ample tribute to
every part of that explanation except the failed effort to
establish a final cause ("I think it leaves us with as many
difficulties as it found us"—129). The phenomenon of "bod
ies striking one another” had been looked into, on the other,
more detached hand, by David Hume at the billiard table; in
this instance the connections between cause and effect were by
no means so certain. Burke, however, was after movements of
neither certainty nor skepticism. He could depend on his own
mind and body and the mind and body of every attentive
reader to verify the motions in question, and acknowledge the
difficulties in arresting them for study: “It is no small bar in
the way of our enquiry into the cause of our passions, that the
occasion of many of them are given, and that their governing
motions are communicated at a time when we have not
capacity to reflect on them” (130—association, he adds, makes
the task even more difficult). Burke was content to verify the
movements of the mind, and to demonstrate and classify them,
without arriving at a final explanation of their causes.
Innocent though he was of any idea of an unconscious state,
Burke’s careful reliance on his own mental experience provided
him with one example of motion which serves as a useful
reminder of just how straightforward the connections were that
he assumed between mind and body. The transfer of motion
across these connections would be direct, clear, and undis
toned. Later readers will, of necessity, suggest various more
complicated mechanisms at work in this instance, and thus be
unable to interpret it only as an instance of muscular sudden
ness:

And I have often experienced, and so have a thousand
others; that on the first inclining towards sleep, we have
been suddenly awakened with a most violent start; and
that this start was generally preceded by a sort of dream
of our falling down a precipice; whence does this strange
motion arise; but from the too sudden relaxation of the
body, which by some mechanism in nature restores itself
by as quick and vigorous an exertion of the contracting
power of the muscles? (148).
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We now have alternate, perhaps more satisfactory and
doubtless more disturbing, explanations of this and other
movements of the mind. I turn from them and this moving
dream to the example, too long withheld, of Thomas Camp
anella, whose mind and body illuminate, confirm, and com
plicate yet again the movements that have here been brought
to mind.
Burke summoned the "celebrated physiognomist” out of the
pages of Jacob Spon's Recherches Cuneuses d‘ Antiquite (1683)
as an observant mimic. When Campanella "had a mind to
penetrate into the inclinations of those he had to deal with, he
composed his face, his gesture, and his whole body, as nearly
as he could into the exact similitude of the person ne intended
to examine; and then carefully observed what turn of mind he
seemed to acquire by this change” (133). Other theorists turn
to LeBrun's Les passions de 1‘ ame or Diderot's Le Paradoxe sur
le comedien to explain or investigate this phenomenon.8 Burke,
instead, inspected the movements of his own mind, and seems
to have expected his reader to do likewise:
I have often observed, that on mimicking the looks and
gestures, of angry, or placid, or frighted, or daring men,
I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that
passion whose appearance I endeavoured to imitate; nay,
am convinced it is hard to avoid it; though one strove
to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures.
Our minds and bodies are so closely and intimately
connected, that one is incapable of pain or pleasure
without the other. (133)

Burke then turns, in one of the Enquiry's most ingenious
moves, to Campanella under torture, where this physiognomist
was able to sever the connections between his own body and
his mind and to defy the movements one imparted to the
other. A Dominican, an empiricist, and, so it was charged, a
revolutionary, he was imprisoned at Naples and tortured:
"Campanella...could so abstract his attention from any suffer
ings of his body, that he was able to endure the rack itself
without much pain” (133). If Burke’s explanation of Campa-

8 The first was delivered in 1668 and published in 1698 and frequently thereafter;
the second was written by 1773, but not published until 1830.
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nella’s ability to suffer unmoved is not very satisfactory, it
joins a long, and continuing, line of unsatisfactory contendings
with the mind-body problem.
The example, eminently
humanistic in several exact senses of that tvord, moves the
reader’s mind in ways that Burke thought would be good for
it.

I have confined myself to the psychodynamics in the pages
of the Enquiry, in hopes that others will pursue this topic
throughout the rest of the period designated in the title of this
new journal, and perhaps beyond those dates. Those who
consider the phenomenon from its origins will have to start
with Democritus and contend with Plato’s distrust of all
disturbances of the soul and all motion this side of the cosmos.
Aristotle’s sharp eye for biology, cause, and telos revealed all
sorts of motion, internal and external, to him. He undertook
to arrest the motions of the mind in the Nicomachean Ethics,
to control them (by way of syllogism) in the Organon, to
define and exploit them in the Rhetorica, and to employ them
in the Poetics. He contends with motion most extensively, if
not most effectively, in the De anima, whence it was carried
over into the scholasticism of Aquinas, where the connections
between the will and the movements of the mind became, as
they remain, a great problem.
Those who look into Longinus, whoever he may have been,
will want to consider the title of his work, its figures of
transport, scattering, and uplift, its images of the echo, the
whirlwind and lightning, the spur and the curb, and its
appreciation of the speed and force of Demosthenes and the
winged horses of Phaeton.9 The most intriguing early inves
tigator of motion and mind is Thomas Hobbes, especially in
chapter 6 of Leviathan and all through the (insufficiently
regarded) Human Nature, with its vivid figure of a foot-race of

9 These and other elements are mentioned, in passing, in an exercise in
appreciation and adjustment between Suzanne Guerlac and Frances Ferguson:
"Longinus and the Subject of the Sublime," and "A Commentary on Suzanne
Guerlac's 'Longinus and the Subject of the Sublime." New Literary History 16
(1985): 275-97. The discussion of the ways in which the sublime challenges the
stability of the self imparts an unwarranted extension to the movements of (and
in) the mind, as if the circulatory system—itself an anachronism in Lon
ginus—extended beyond the epidermis. Neil Hertz's frequently cited 'A Reading
of Longinus' incites the mind to move between Longinus's citations; first
published in French in 1973, it is most recently accessible in his The End of the
Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985), 1-20.
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the passions.10 Addison and Hume will offer salutary clarifica
tions, most of them in need of just the kind of modifications
that Burke has supplied.
Motion may, for all I know, have already been traced
through the rarefied atmosphere of French rationalism, or
sifted out of the densities of German idealism and transcend
ence.
Those brave souls who pursue the topic into the
metaphysics of the Critiques, will have to contend with Kant’s
re fusings of what the empiricists had carefully discriminated,
not to mention the Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe
(1758) and his view “that motion is a real interaction of
substances in space and time and not the actualization of a
rational possibility.’”11 It may well be that Kant’s uncoerced
aesthetics neither require nor permit motion—the dynamics of
nature in the Third Critique elude the human mind, while
those of aesthetics must be rendered independent of the body.12
If Frances Ferguson is right, that “the formalist project not
only failed to save empiricism, it also failed to see that em
piricism itself (or what is seen as contingency in some ac
counts, social determination in others, and the inability of
language to remain self identical in still others) was bound to
be disabling for it” (Ferguson, Solitude, vii), then the motions
that were brought to the empirical mind must constitute an
unjustly overlooked refinement of that no longer appreciated
-ism. Before anyone else leaps off the idealist bandwagon to
cast “hirself” under the wheels of the post-modernist jugger
naut, perhaps this refinement of empiricism should be recon
sidered.
I do not expect that this investigation will draw energy from
or impart it to the “middle class’s struggle for political hege
mony,” nor surrender without a struggle of its own to the
immobilities of functionalism as set forth in Terry Eagleton’s

10 See the discussion of Aristotle and Hobbes in my Certain, Lively Episodes: The
Articulation of Passion in Eighteenth Century Prose (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1990), 31-8, 69-72, and the sources cited therein.
11 Caygill, 210, discussing the New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical
Knowledge (1755).
12 Frances Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime, 71-4, 81. Ferguson has discussed
Burke’s later distrust of the sublime and the extent to which “property"
participates in his aesthetics in “Legislating the Sublune" in Studies in Eight
eenth-Century British Art and Aesthetics, ed. Ralph Cohen, Publications from the
Clark Library Professorship, 9 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985),
128-47, esp. 134-8.
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The Ideology of the Aesthetic.13 Eagleton's emphasis on em
piricism and physiology is certainly correct, and strikingly put,
but he insists on a labor, rather than a dynamic, theory of the
sublime.
Peter De Balla's text purports to be intrigued with "trans
port," modifications of power, and the instability of the
subject. But it is so seduced by its own discursivity, so
"knowing about its own horizon, its own speaking seeing, its
own trajectory and its own excess," that it registers no move
ment other than its own.14
A better understanding of the psychodynamics of em
piricism will not rescue formalism (as who would want to),
but it may well reinvigorate empiricism, complicate and
authenticate contingency, and loosen the bonds of social
determination. Before the materiality of language takes over
completely from the materiality of mind (which itself took
over from the materiality of material), perhaps we should look
again at the means by which all of these entities were once
invigorated.
Once the "tablet of experience" (Ferguson,
Solitude, 2) is seen as a means of retaining the traces of mo
non, empiricism, as I think I have shown, develops new
complications and plausibilities. These complications and
plausibilities are embedded in most of the examples Edmund
Burke selected to put before the mind of his reader.

13 (Oxford Basil Blackwell. 199C); the pertinent chapter is ’The Law of the
Heart Shaftesbury, Hume. Burke." 33 -69; the middle class struggles on 3, and
passum. Something of the inertness of Eagleton's system may be seen in his
discussion of the "self-disseminatory power" of natural rights: "is there are indeed
metaphysical rights, then they enter this dense somatic space as dispersed and
non identical
like 'rays of light which pierce into a dense medium ’ (57—the
system, though never the discussion, of "Free Particulars," 13-30, is similarly
inert).
Before aesthetics are wholly consigned to one or another political
economy, the intricacies of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), as set
forth in Caygill, 85-98, should be consulted.
14 The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1989, 23; see also 37 and 65.

